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The background and origins of these three memoranda are fully described in the 
páper by Christopher Seton-W atson, entitled "R. W. Seton-Watson and the Czecho-
slovaks 1935-1939", which will be published in the proceedings of the Bad Wiessee 
Tagung of November 1988. The first memorandum hada limited private circulation. 
A very briefsummary ofits Contents was published by Seton-Watson in 1943 as an ap-
pendix to his History ofthe Czechs and Slovaks. The two other memoranda werepri-
vately drculated to all members of the House of Commons and to a select number of 
peers. Seton-Watson incorporated some of their contents in his Munich and the Dicta-
tors, which appeared in March 1939. The füll texts are here published for the first time. 
Memorandum I 
Herr Henlein lectured at Chatham House' on Monday, 9 December 1935.1 met him at dinner 
beforehand and had some preliminary conversation, but I also spent the whole of the following 
evening with him, the only other person present being our host Colonel M. G. Christie2, and on 
this occasion I had with him four hours of exceedingly frank discussion during which it was pos-
sible to press him in many directions and to deal with specific points in greater detail than on the 
previous evening. I ought to say at once - without for one moment committing myself to endor-
sing the man or his policy - that my generál impression was very much more favourable than I 
had expected. Even allowing for the fact that he was on his very best behaviour in London, and 
was specially on his guard in conversation with me, I found that he held his own very skilfully, 
rarely evaded questions, however pointed or embarrassing, and avoided demagogie arguments. 
He also refrained from personal attacks in a way very unusual among the many politicians with 
whom it was my fate to talk in the old Monarchy: in some cases this may have been due to his 
knowledge of my friendly relations with the persons in question, but he habitually refrained in 
cases where this would not apply. 
His address of the previous evening and his interview in the Daily Telegraph formed a natural 
point of departure for our main conversation, and it is therefore well to begin by summarising 
their principál contents. 
He aeeepted the existing Constitution, Treaties and Minority Treaty as a basis of an agreement 
between Czechoslovaks and Sudetian Germans. 
He ruled out not only all question of German Bohemia (either as a whole or in part) uniting 
with Germany, but also admitted the impossibility of separating the Czech and German districts 
and insisted on the essential unity of the Bohemian Lands throughout history and no less today. 
He did not put forward any scheme for the 'Zweiteilung' of the Bohemian Lands. 
He expressly declared Revision of Frontiers to be no Solution and used language on the subject 
of minorities which I found to be practically identical with my own published views. 
He rejected Pan Germanism and Panslavism as equally catastrophic. 
He declared the totalitarian principle to be untenable, and declared in favour of 'an honest 
demoeraey'. 'We want a demoeraey such as is recommended by Masaryk'. 
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H e repudiate d anti-semitism , affirmed tha t ther e was no Aryan Paragrap h in his part y pro -
gramme , and while admittin g tha t man y of his followers held th e othe r view, claime d tha t he had 
mor e tha n onc e rouse d thei r criticism by defendin g th e Jews. 
While laying great stress on his generá l Germa n sympathies , he denie d 'Nazism ' or 'Hitlerism ' 
to be a doctrin e suitable for exportation . 
I expressed quit e frankly m y surprise and satisfaction (shared , I added , by other s who were 
presen t at Chatha m House ) at his views as briefly summarise d above, and the n asked him 
whethe r such a programm e would no t mee t with Oppositio n inside his own party , especially in 
view of th e somewha t heterogeneou s element s of which it was composed . To thi s he replied 
quit e unconcernedl y tha t what he had said in Londo n had lon g been know n to , and fully 
endorse d by, his whole party , and in particula r tha t all th e item s which caused me surprise and 
satisfaction were to be foun d almos t verbatim in his big speech of 21 Octobe r 1934 at Leipa 3. H e 
the n hande d me a reprin t of tha t speech , and I was able to convinc e myself from it tha t th e point s 
summarise d above are actuall y containe d in it. 
H e the n clinche d his argumen t by informin g me tha t he had tha t very mornin g telephone d 
hom e th e sense of his intervie w in th e Dail y Telegraph , and tha t ther e coul d be no doub t tha t his 
followers would accep t its terms . 
H e also informe d me tha t before deliverin g th e Leipa speech , he had submitte d a draft to cer-
tain Czec h politician s for thei r opinion , and had been encourage d by the m to go on , on e of the m 
going so far as to say tha t such a pronouncemen t migh t be an epochmakin g event in th e histor y 
of th e Republic . But , he added , thoug h th e speech was delivered , non e of th e Czec h leader s reac -
ted , and the result was "gleich Null" . 
When I asked him why he had no t followed up th e speech by frank persona l discussion with 
representativ e Czec h and Slovák leaders , he assured me tha t from tha t day to thi s he ha d nevěr 
been able to obtai n access eithe r to th e Presiden t or to any membe r of th e Government , thoug h 
he would welcom e such conversations , as indee d th e onl y possible way of clearin g th e ground . 
H e mad e no concealmen t of th e fact tha t th e part y for which he and his followers had th e mos t 
sympath y was th e Czec h Agrarian Party , and in passing he spoke highly of M . Svehla 4 and 
greatly regrette d his prematur e death . H e adde d tha t he feared tha t th e mai n Oppositio n to him -
self and his part y cam e from Dr . Beneš . 
Thi s brough t us to a generá l discussion of foreign policy, and her e I had th e impressio n tha t he 
was muc h less au couraní tha n in hom e affairs, and thoug h takin g a highly intelligen t interest , 
was no t familiär with man y details . Fo r instance , when I pu t to him tha t from my persona l 
knowledge of th e Croatia n problé m he (Henlein ) seemed to me to be very muc h neare r t o Pragu e 
tha n Dr . Maček 5 was to Belgrade , he did no t respon d - no t because he in any way dissented , but , 
it seemed to me , because he was no t very familiär with th e subject or even very keenly interested . 
O n th e subject of relation s with German y he was very frank . At th e Chatha m Hous e debat ě 
he had alread y repudiate d so categoricall y all connectio n with Hitle r and th e Naz i Part y in Ger -
many , and had answered so sturdil y (an d poin t by point ) a lon g series of highly offensive que -
stion s as to his relation s with Krebs 6, Hassellblatt 7, Neuwirt 8 and other s and as to alleged Naz i 
suppor t of his part y funds , tha t I coul d no t press him furthe r withou t insultin g him . But he said 
very frankly tha t he had been repeatedl y pressed to mak e a publi c attac k on Hitle r an d th e Thir d 
Reich , but tha t thi s was to o muc h to ask. H e was a keen believer in Germa n cultura l unit y and 
racia l kinship , but repudiate d th e Pa n Germa n idea in any politica l form and regarde d th e Naz i 
programm e as unsuite d for exportatio n beyon d th e frontier s of th e Reich . 
When he treate d Pa n Germanis m and Panslavism as mor e or less equa l dangers , I argued tha t 
th e latte r was dead except as a generá l underlyin g sentimen t such as would dete r an y Western or 
Souther n Slav from enterin g an ope n conflic t with Russia . If (so I argued ) he in his tur n claime d 
tha t to ask th e Germa n Citizen s of a Slav statě to fight against German y would be to o much , I 
personall y would accep t such a view; bu t I feared tha t a ne w Pa n Germanis m was formin g in th e 
Thir d Reic h which aime d at th e conques t of Slav territory . H e dissociate d himsel f from such a 
view, but did no t pursu e th e subject further , and I again feit, no t so muc h tha t he was evasive, as 
tha t he was on unfamilia r ground . Th e conversatio n scarcely got ont o th e Hungaria n questio n at 
all, and her e again I feit he was on unfamilia r ground , thoug h he seemed to have n o sympath y 
whatsoeve r with Hungaria n revisionist claims . As regards th e Austrian question , his view was 
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tha t it coul d onl y be solved by th e Austrian peopl e itself by a free vote, but we did no t get down 
to details . 
H e was very explicit in his opinio n tha t it ough t to be possible to reach an agreemen t between 
th e Czech s and German s on th e basis of th e existing Constitution : and it is indee d obvious tha t 
onc e th e point s summarise d above have been conceded , thei r disagreemen t reduce s itself to a 
mer e matte r of bargainin g on point s of fact and on th e exten t of possible concessions . N o funda -
menta l concessio n of principl e is involved on eithe r side, since he accept s th e existing framewor k 
of th e Stat e and th e Constitution , while th e Stat e has alread y concede d in theor y th e füll of equa -
lity of rights for all minorities . 
H e argued with bot h force and earnestnes s tha t he was being drawn int o an impossible Situa-
tion ; tha t he had at first given his followers Instruction s to adop t parliamentar y tactic s and takepar t 
in debate s and politica l work; tha t the y were isolated and virtually boycotted , and tha t all othe r 
partie s were concerne d to show the m tha t the y coul d attai n nothin g at all by adoptin g démocrati e 
methods : tha t thoug h he still had an almos t embarrassingl y stron g hold upo n his followers, such 
a Situatio n coul d no t continu e indefinitely , and tha t the y were boun d to lose patience ; tha t he 
himsel f did no t inten d to chang e to anothe r mor e radica l policy, and tha t if his presen t efforts f ai-
led, he would retirefrompolitica l life; bu t tha t thi s mean t a catastrophi c break , because th e wilder 
element s would the n com e to th e surface. H e coul d no t understan d why responsibl e statesme n 
refused to discuss with him , and he asked, where coul d he tur n if the y all with on e accor d rebuffed 
him ? To Germany ? H e need no t explain to me what would be said if he too k tha t course , and he 
had no desire to do so. To Austria? Tha t would be quit e ineffective in presen t conditions . Wher e 
eise coul d he turn ? Would Pragu e shut its eyes to his dilemma ? Thi s explaine d in par t th e readi -
ness with which he accepte d th e invitatio n to London , as he hope d it migh t dra w renewe d atten -
tion to his aims, and he had , he added , stated his čase very moderatel y and omitte d man y detail s 
with regard to Germa n grievances which he migh t legitimatel y have quoted . 
H e was carefu l no t to pu t forward any claim for inclusio n in th e Government , and he defini-
tely disclaime d any idea of insistin g on totalitarianism . I suggested to him tha t th e Governmen t 
was in a somewha t delicat e positio n and coul d no t be expecte d to thro w over its old friends and 
collaborator s amon g th e German s in orde r to negotiat e with him . H e frankly admitte d thi s to be 
a difficulty, but refraine d from th e obvious rejoinde r tha t th e Governmen t coul d in th e first in-
stanc e negotiate , or at any rat e 'talk' , withou t throwin g over its friends or in any way committin g 
itself beforehand . 
In on e directio n I foun d his answers entirel y obscur e and unsatisfactory , námel y as to his rea-
sons for himsel f remainin g outsid e Parliament . Th e story of his reluctanc e to také on oath of 
loyalty he was able to brush aside, by pointin g ou t tha t he had alread y taken such an oat h as an 
arm y officer. But a positive answer was no t fortheoming . 
To sum up m y own impression , th e whole questio n resolves itself int o on e of Confidence . Ca n 
Her r Henlei n be trusted ? Ca n his assurance s be taken at thei r face value? And if so, can he carr y 
th e German s with him ? To m y mind , th e onl y possible attitud e on th e par t of th e responsibl e 
Czec h leader s is to pu t him to th e test . To refuse discussion with a man whose public assurances , 
writte n and spoken , are so explicit and so far-reaching , would be to place onesel f in th e wrong. 
O n th e othe r han d a frank exchang e of views canno t do har m and ma y do good , eithe r by remo -
ving misunderstanding s or by exposing insincerity . Th e statesme n of Pragu e have two prece -
dent s before the m - the Sout h Afričan, in which forme r enemie s accepte d th e basis of th e statě 
and were in th e end converte d int o firm friends , and th e Irish , in which th e necessar y minimu m 
concession s were steadily refused unti l demand s grew increasingl y radica l and in th e end a Solu-
tion was adopte d which did no t respec t th e existing basis of th e statě . 
14th Decembe r 1935 [handwritten ] R. W. Seton-Watso n [handwritten ] 
1 Th e Roya l Institut e of Internationa l Affairs is locate d in Chatha m House . 
2 Graha m Christie , a forme r Air attach é in Berlin , to whom Henlei n had been introduce d by the 
Bohemi a Coun t Khuen-Belasy , was Henlein' s contac t in London . 
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3 In his speech at Böhmisc h Leipa , Henlei n mad e his stronges t pronouncemen t of loyalty so far 
to th e Czechoslova k State . H e did however still mak e a compariso n between th e Sudete n Ger -
man Homefron t and th e Nationa l Socialist Movement . 
4 Antoní n Švehla (1873-1933) , chairma n of th e Czechoslova k Agrarian Part y and Prim e Mini -
ster (1922-1929) . 
5 Vladimir Mače k (1879-1964) , from 1928, chairma n ofth e Croatia n Agrarian Party , advocate d 
a federal transformatio n of th e Kingdo m of Serbia , Croati a and Slovenia . 
6 Hans-Kreb s (1888-1947) , DNSA P secretar y in th e Sudete n land s (1918-1931) , fled to Ger -
man y as a result of th e so-calle d Volkssport , later NSDA P Gauleiter . 
7 Werne r Hasselblat t (1890-1958) , Baltic Germa n politican , cofounde r ofth e Genev a Nationa -
lities Congres s and head of th e Verband der deutsche n Volksgruppen in Europ a (1931 -1945) . 
8 Han s Neuwirt h (1902-1970) , Attorne y in Prague , Sudete n Germa n Part y deput y in th e Cze -
choslova k Parliamen t (1935-1938) , in 1938, resigned from his politica l position s and retire d 
from politics . 
Memorandum II 
Negotiation s and decision s of th e utmos t gravity, affecting th e foreign polic y and th e honou r 
of Britain and th e whole futur e of Europe , have durin g th e last f ortnigh t been taken by th e Prim e 
Ministe r and Cabinet , withou t eithe r public opinio n or Parliamen t being mad e acquainte d with 
them , and in such a manne r as to presen t th e world with somethin g dangerousl y like a fait 
accompli. I t would seem of vital importanc e tha t Member s of Parliament , before the y listen to 
th e official Statement s when Parliamen t reassembles , shoul d be in possession of th e essentia l f acts 
on which to form a judgemen t as to what has been don e in thei r name . With thi s object in view, 
th e following brief summar y of (1) th e Join t Franco-Britis h Not e to Czechoslovakia , (2) of th e 
Czechoslova k reply, and (3) of th e Frenc h and British Ministers ' demarch e in Prague , has been 
prepared , pendin g publicatio n of th e füll texts. 
I 
Th e British and Frenc h Minister s me t in Londo n on Sunda y 18th Septembe r and eventuall y 
drew up a Join t Not e for transmissio n to th e Czechoslova k Government . 
Thi s Not e stated tha t after a discussion of th e British Prim e Minister' s repor t on his conversa -
tion s with Her r Hitler , and of Lor d Runciman' s repor t on his Pragu e Mission , th e two Govern -
ment s reache d agreemen t on th e following eight points . 
1. The y announc e tha t th e two Government s "find themselve s forced to conclude " tha t th e 
maintenanc e of peace and th e protectio n of Czechoslovakia' s vital interest s can onl y be "effecti-
vely assured", if "the district s inhabite d mainl y by Sudete n Germans " are "transferre d to th e 
Reich" . 
2. Th e desired result , it is argued , coul d be attaine d eithe r by direc t transfe r or by plebiscite , 
and in view of th e difficulty of th e latte r (an d "in particular , th e possibility of repercussion s on a 
grand scale" -  repercussions de grand envergure) it is assumed tha t th e Czech s would prefer th e 
forme r method . 
3. Th e district s to be transferre d would be thos e containin g over 50 per cen t of Germa n inha -
bitants : but "we have ground for hopin g tha t an adjustmen t of frontier s coul d be obtaine d where 
necessar y (nous avons tout lieu ď espérer ď obteniř), and thi s by way of negotiation s unde r th e 
directio n of an internationa l organism , includin g a Czechoslova k representative" . 
4. Thi s organism coul d also deal with a possible exchang e of populatio n on th e basis of a right 
of Option . 
5. "We recognise " tha t if th e Czechoslova k Governmen t accepts , "it is justified in demandin g 
assurance s for its futur e security ". 
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6. Th e Frenc h and British Government s would therefor e be disposed , "as a contributio n to 
th e pacificatio n of Europe" , t o associate themselve s with an internationa l guarante e of th e ne w 
frontie r against all unprovoke d aggression - thi s guarante e replacin g "the treatie s actuall y in 
vigour". 
7. Th e two Government s recognis e th e exten t of th e sacrifices demanded , bu t hold it to be a 
commo n interes t of Europ e and especially of Czechoslovakia , and an essentia l conditio n for 
maintainin g peace . 
8. The y conclud e by asking a reply by Wednesda y at latest , and earlier if possible, because 
Mr . Chamberlai n mus t resum é his conversation s with Mr . Hitler . 
II 
Th e Czechoslova k Governmen t in reply pointe d ou t tha t th e Franco-Britis h proposal s had 
been drafte d withou t previou s consultatio n of thos e mos t vitally concerned , and therefor e did 
no t také accoun t of what was possible or impossible . Thei r executio n would be anti-democratic , 
impossible withou t referenc e to Parliament , and tantamoun t to mutilation : th e country' s econo -
mic life would be completel y paralysed . I t would destro y th e whole balanc e of power in Centra l 
Europ e an d in Europ e as a whole . 
While cordiall y thankin g th e British Governmen t for its offer of a guarantee , the y pointe d ou t 
tha t tha t Governmen t had itself "underline d th e fact tha t a Solutio n shoul d be foun d within th e 
framewor k of th e Czechoslova k Constitutio n -  a basis which no t even th e Sudete n Germa n Part y 
had rejected durin g its discussion s with Prague" . 
The y appeale d to th e German-Czechoslova k Arbitratio n Treat y of 16th October , 1926, 
which th e Germa n Governmen t had on several occasion s recognise d as still in force . 
The y conclude d with "a suprem e appeal " to th e two Government s "to reconside r thei r atti -
tude" . 
* * * 
I t will thu s be seen tha t th e British Governmen t in particula r after subjectin g th e Czecho -
slovak Governmen t to man y weeks of pressure throug h th e mediu m of th e Runcima n Mission 
(sometime s insistin g on greate r haste of concession , sometime s holdin g the m back from a deci-
sion or from referenc e to Parliament ) suddenl y altogethe r abandone d th e whole basis on which 
tha t Mission was workin g (námely , a German-Czec h compromis e within th e framewor k of th e 
Czechoslova k statě ) and presente d Pragu e with a real ultimatu m involving dismembermen t in 
th e event of acceptanc e and abandonmen t in th e event of rejection . All thi s withou t consultatio n 
or warning , and in defianc e of th e element s of démocrati e practic e -  with , in effect, a tim e limit 
shorte r tha n tha t accorde d by Austria-Hungar y in her ultimatu m to Serbia in 1914. 
I t is no exaggeration to deseribe thi s as th e mos t f ormidabl e deman d ever presente d by a British 
Governmen t to a friendly nation : and th e Prim e Ministe r ma y be challenge d to produc e from th e 
histor y of ou r foreign polic y any documen t so humiliatin g and so contrar y of th e spirit of th e 
country . Ther e is indee d hardl y any attemp t to concea l th e fact tha t it was dictate d to th e Prim e 
Ministe r by th e Führe r at Berchtesgaden . 
II I 
Even this , however , was no t held to be enough . Th e British and Frenc h Minister s in Pragu e 
received instruction s to make an immediat e démarche to Presiden t Benesh apropos of th e Cze -
choslova k reply. Thi s démarche was mad e at 2 a.m . on 21st Septembe r and was unde r four heads . 
1. Britain and Franc e have th e dut y to preven t an Europea n War, if humanl y possible and thu s 
an invasion of Czechoslovakia . 
2. The y wish th e Czechoslova k Governmen t to realise tha t if it does no t unconditionally and 
at once accep t th e Anglo-Frenc h Plan , it will stan d before th e world as solely responsibl e for th e 
ensuin g war. 
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3. By refusing, Czechoslovaki a will also be guilty of destroyin g Anglo-Frenc h solidarity , 
since , in that event *, Britain will under no circumstances march, even if France went to the aid of 
Czechoslovakia. 
4. If the refusal shoul d provok e a war, Franc e gives official notic e tha t she will no t fulfil he r 
treat y obligations . 
Bot h Minister s insisted upo n immediat e and unconditiona l complianc e -  in othe r words, 
withou t any possibility of referenc e to Parliamen t or public opinio n in any form whatsoever . 
Th e form in which thi s secon d ultimatu m was delivered , appear s t o have been even mor e ab-
rup t and woundin g tha n th e origina l Note : and no bette r proo f of its crushin g effect can be foun d 
tha n th e fact tha t Genera l Faucher 1, th e distinguishe d Frenc h soldier who had been lent to th e 
Czechoslova k Staff and who was presen t at th e interview, at onc e declare d to Presiden t Benesh 
tha t he was ashame d to be a Frenchma n and desired to be accepte d as a Czechoslova k citizen . 
Ther e are man y Briton s to-da y who fully understan d his feelings and share his humiliation . 
I t remain s to be seen whethe r th e Prim e Ministe r will be able to justify before Parliamen t thi s 
abject capitulatio n to Her r Hitle r and th e undemocrati c metho d of condemnin g th e victim un -
hear d and committin g ou r own countr y in advanc e to fundamenta l change s in th e ma p of Europ e 
and th e balanc e of world power . 
But it is scarcely less importan t to discover who is responsibl e for th e actua l detail s of th e pian 
forced upo n th e Czech s -  in view of th e fact tha t it is literally incapabl e of executio n and would 
break down even in th e improbabl e event of an internationa l bod y being set up for its examina -
tion . N o one , of any nationality , who has any first-han d acquaintanc e with condition s in Cze -
choslovaki a or with th e historica l backgroun d of th e century-ol d German-Czec h dispute , can 
fail to agree tha t it is almos t equally objectionabl e from the political , economic , strategie and 
administrativ e poin t of view, and even racially ope n to grave objections . Th e adoptio n of th e 
entirel y arbitrar y figuře of 50 per cen t Germa n district s has no meanin g savé to produc e chao s 
and ope n the doo ř of th e fortress to th e Troja n Horše . Th e ne w line would abando n th e natura l 
watersheds , cu t across th e lower reache s of Valleys, leave industria l district s in th e air, severed 
from thei r natura l customers . I t will dislocat e th e whole economi c life of th e statě , equally as 
regards minin g and textiles. I t will deprive th e Czech s of mos t of thei r "Magino t Line " and leave 
the m def enceless . I t will even cut importan t railway connections , e. g., between Pragu e and Brn o 
ánd Slovakia -  a proposa l like euttin g off Londo n from Mancheste r and from Scotland . 
Unde r th e final ultimatu m of Her r Hitle r to th e Czech s -  sent throug h Mr . Chamberlai n as 
intermediar y -  th e 50 per cen t area is to be evacuate d by army , police an d custom s officials by 
Ist October , in its present condition (which mean s tha t th e fortification s inside th e areas mus t 
no t be dismantled . AU German s in th e Czechoslova k arm y and police are to be at onc e dismissed 
and allowed to retur n home , and all Germa n politica l prisoner s are to be set free (withou t any 
reciprocity) . In th e othe r zone s ther e is to be a plebiscit e by 25th Novembe r at latest , unde r con -
tro l of an internationa l Commissio n in which all person s residen t in th e area before 28th Octobe r 
1918 are t o vote: and durin g th e plebiscit e bot h sides are to withdra w thei r militar y forces. In 
othe r words th e Czechoslova k arm y is to surrende r all its mos t vital defence s and lay its capita l 
ope n to immediat e oceupation , withou t any guarante e whatsoeve r tha t discussion of detail s will 
thereafte r be tolerate d by the victoriou s Führer . 
N o on e would eriticise th e two Government s for going to great length s in th e exercise of pres-
sure on both parties to th e dispute , in th e interes t of th e great aim of Europea n peace . But in 
actua l fact thei r pressur e has been entirel y one-sided , and Mr . Chamberlai n went to Berchtes -
gaden , but avoided going to Pragu e to hea r th e othe r side. 
N o on e seriously denie s tha t th e German s of Bohemi a have just grievances: but it is time , in 
th e nam e of justice, tha t ou r Government , while continuin g to urge th e redres s of these grievan-
ces by peacefu l mean s such as thos e advocate d by th e Runcima n Mission , shoul d at lon g last 
publicl y acknowledg e (on th e basis of th e ampl e Informatio n in its possession) tha t th e Germa n 
minorit y in Czechoslovaki a was alread y infinitel y th e best treate d in all Centra l and Sout h 
* i. e., presumably , in contradistinctio n to her attitud e in th e event of Czec h acceptance . 
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Easter n Europe , and tha t th e furthe r concession s promise d by th e Hodž a Governmen t throug h 
th e Runcima n Mission would have secured to it a positio n of unequalle d privilege. 
Th e Fourt h Pia n ma y be criticise d as going to o far, but no t as inadequate . As it is, th e British 
Government , in suddenl y abandonin g it in favour of a schem e of nake d partition , has in its tur n 
yielded to an ultimatu m from German y supporte d by th e füll blast of Germa n official press and 
wireless calumn y against th e Czechs . Thi s is no t th e way to secure peace , bu t merel y prepare s 
th e way for fresh demands , such as simultaneou s cessions to Hungar y and Polan d and th e com -
plete partitio n of th e Czechoslova k statě . 
Germany's Aims 
Why has th e Germa n campaig n been concentrate d against Czechoslovakia , where the Germa n 
minorit y is so muc h bette r treate d tha n th e Germa n minoritie s in Italy , Poland , Hungary , 
Roumani a and Jugoslavia? 
1. Any good physica l ma p shows Bohemi a to be a strategie key of th e highest importanc e -
eithe r as a defensive positio n against Germa n expansion , or as a poin t of vantage from which 
German y can mak e herself impregnable . Remov e it, and German y can safely concentrat e her 
forces against th e West, having wiped ou t an efficient arm y of 1500000 men with 2000 planes , 
having possessed herself of some of th e largest munitio n works and steel and iron plant s in 
Europe , and having cut off th e Balkan states from thei r best supply of munitions . In any futur e 
conflict , therefore , German y would be virtually immun e from th e danger s of blockad e and also 
immun e from th e dange r of being caugh t up in armament . 
2. Czechoslovaki a is th e last stronghol d of démocrati e governmen t east of th e Rhine . He r 
destructio n is therefor e desirable , th e mor e so because it would be a severe blow to the démocra -
tie forces striving, with reasonabl e prospect s of success, to recover groun d in Polan d and in th e 
Balkan Peninsula . 
3. Czechoslovaki a and he r Presiden t have been consisten t supporter s of th e League of 
Nation s and th e principl e on which it rests. Thei r downfal l would be a furthe r nai l in its coffin, 
and a warnin g to all smaller nations . 
4. He r abandonmen t would be a fatal blow to th e prestige of th e two Western Power s and 
would leave the m to face thei r fate alon e at no distan t dáte . 
5. Incidentally , it would endange r th e futur e of Polan d (despit e her temporar y arrangemen t 
with Berlin ) and probabl y force th e Littl e Entent e and Balkan Entent e int o th e Germa n orbit . 
26th Septembe r 1938 R. W. Seton-Watso n 
1 Louis-Eugěn e Fauche r (1874-1964) , Brigadier General , from 1919 with th e Frenc h militar y 
mission in Prague , later chief of the mission (1928-1938) , joined th e Czechoslova k arm y in 
Septembe r 1938 and becam e a Citizen of Czechoslovakia . 
Memorandum III 
Godesberg and Munich 
Th e essence of th e recen t erisis is tha t th e Prim e Ministe r presente d th e countr y and Parliamen t 
with a. fait accompli which it was no longer possible to undo . Thi s result was attaine d first by th e 
steady refusal to allow Parliamen t to be summoned , and secondl y by imposin g a settlemen t upo n 
Czechoslovaki a by thre e successive ultimat a (1) th e Anglo-Frenc h Plan of 18th September , 
(2) the Join t British-Frenc h démarche of 2 a.m . on 21st September , and (3) th e deman d addressed 
on th e 30th Septembe r to th e Pragu e Governmen t from Munic h for immediat e acceptanc e of th e 
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Fou r Powe r decisions . Be it note d in passing tha t in each of these cases it was deliberatel y mad e 
impossible for th e Czec h Governmen t to consul t its own Parliamen t or public opinion ; for th e 
tim e limit for an answer on th e first occasio n was shorte r tha n th e 48 hour s grante d by Austria-
Hungar y to Serbia in 1914, and on th e thir d occasio n it was onl y somethin g like 2 hours\ 
Mr . Chamberlai n in his speech of 3rd Octobe r in th e Hous e of Common s describe d th e 
Godesber g Memorandu m of Her r Hitle r as "in fact an ultimatum , with a tim e limit of 6 days" 
and as "these unacceptabl e terms" . But he laid great stress on th e differenc e between th e Godes -
berg Memorandu m and the Munic h Agreement , and even went so far as to argue tha t "on th e dif-
ferenc e between thos e two document s will depen d th e judgmen t as to whethe r we were success-
ful in what we set ou t to do , námel y to find an orderl y instea d of a violent metho d of carryin g 
ou t an agreed decision" . N o on e doubt s tha t th e Prim e Minister , on his retur n from Munich , was 
genuinel y persuade d tha t he had won substantia l modification s of, and improvement s upon , th e 
Godesber g proposals . Non e th e less anyon e who takés th e troubl e to compar e Mr . Chamber -
lain' s own interpretatio n of Godesber g with th e actua l settlemen t drafte d in Munic h and filled in 
in detai l by th e Berlin Internationa l Commission , is forced to th e conclusio n tha t Munic h (or 
"Munich-Berlin" ) so far from being an improvement , is in man y cases decidedl y worse. Thi s can 
be demonstrate d poin t by point . 
(1) Th e Prim e Ministe r mad e great play with th e fact tha t Munic h was a reversion to th e An-
glo-Frenc h Plan* , tha t it laid down th e principl e of "internationa l supervision " by th e Fou r 
Powers , and tha t it provide d for Germa n militar y occupatio n no longer "in on e Operatio n by 
Ist October" , but "in five clearly defined stages" between Ist and lOth October . But bot h in th e 
Czec h answer to th e origina l Plan , and later in th e Czec h Not e criticisin g th e Godesber g 
Memorandum , it was strongl y urged tha t so shor t a tim e limit for evacutatio n would inevitabl y 
involve no t merel y th e surrende r of th e line of fortifications , but th e laying bare of thei r inner -
mos t secret s to th e Germa n army . Thi s was, of course , th e main reason for Germany' s insistenc e 
and haste ; but so deaf to all reason were th e British and Frenc h statesmen , tha t the y ignore d th e 
warnin g as to th e consequence s tha t such a surrende r would have upo n France' s defenc e of th e 
Magino t Line (upo n which th e Czec h line was modelled) . 
Moreover , Czechoslovaki a was forced to surrende r all its mos t vital defence s before th e condi -
tion s of th e settlemen t to be impose d upo n her by th e Internationa l Commissio n coul d be mad e 
known , i. e. before th e futur e frontie r had been defined , and withou t any guarante e tha t a discus-
sion of detail s would be tolerated . 
(2) Mr . Chamberlai n in th e Hous e admitte d tha t th e line laid down at Godesber g "did také in 
a numbe r of areas which coul d no t be called predominantl y Germa n in character" . But th e Berlin 
Commissio n did what Mr . Chamberlai n decline d to do : it accepte d thi s line and "improved " 
upo n it by assigning to German y furthe r areas which were predominantl y or even purel y Czec h 
in character . 
Fo r instance , to th e numerou s Czec h commune s alread y demande d by German y at Godes -
berg ther e have no w been adde d such Czec h district s as th e town of Poličk a with 6 neighbourin g 
commune s (11739 Czech s and 503 Germans) ; a large par t of th e district s of Opava , Bílovec and 
Příbor , includin g large and importan t industria l town s and communicatio n centre s such as Svi-
no v (railway junctio n and broadcastin g station , 4319 Czech s and 722 Germans) , Trebovic e 
(large moder n power station , 1751 Czech s and 71 Germans) , Klimkovic e (2934 Czech s and 229 
Germans) , Kopřivnic e (large railway carriage works and th e "Tatra " automobil e and aeroplan e 
works, 3968 Czech s and 622 Germans) , Štramber k (lime and cemen t works, 3497 Czech s and 
46 Germans ) & c. A specially strikin g example is th e town of Krumlo v in Sout h Moravia , which 
togethe r with 4 adjacen t commune s has been adde d to th e Godesber g area , althoug h it has a large 
Czec h majorit y (3047 Czech s and 349 Germans ) and althoug h th e ne w frontie r her e no w forms 
a very artificia l and unnatura l loop . 
* I t is necessar y to add tha t th e real mischie f was don ě by thi s highly inequitabl e "Pian" . Mr . 
Chamberlai n skilfully evaded all criticism of it by th e dramati c announcemen t of his propose d 
flight to Munich : and on his retur n th e Anglo-Frenc h Pian coul d alread y be treate d as a gene-
rally accepte d basis. 
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(3) Th e Berlin Commission , in fixing th e Fifth Zone , entirel y disregarde d th e principl e of 
cedin g onl y district s with over 50 per cen t of Germans , bu t justified its actio n by treatin g the 
Czec h areas which it ceded as compensatio n for th e Germa n enclaves and scattere d Germa n 
populatio n in what remaine d of Czechoslovakia . In so doin g the y ignore d th e existence of simi-
lar Czec h enclaves or minoritie s in the 50 per cen t Germa n district s alread y cede d accordin g to 
th e principle s of th e Anglo-Frenc h Pian . To sum up , th e Berlin decision assigned to German y in 
Norther n Moravi a and Silesia 254 Czec h commune s with 221044 Czech s and 14565 Germans , 
and in Souther n Moravi a 38 Czec h communes , with 54287 Czech s and 16559 Germans . 
I t ma y be note d in passing tha t some of these decision s were based on th e Commission' s accep -
tanc e of th e Germa n deman d tha t the statistic s of th e last Austrian censu s of 1910 should be used 
(instea d of th e Czechoslova k Censu s of 1930 or 1920) althoug h tha t censu s was based no t upo n 
nationalit y or mother-tongue , but upo n th e so-calle d "Umgangssprache" or "language of inter -
course" . 
In view of th e Führer' s assuranc e quote d by Mr . Chamberlai n in his speech of 28th of Septem -
ber tha t "he had no wish to includ e in th e Reic h peopl e of othe r races tha n Germans" , it is no t 
clear on what principl e th e Commissio n acted , unless economi c and strategie interest s of Ger -
man y were allowed to overrid e Czec h nationa l rights. 
If th e frontie r laid down at Berlin shoul d be mad e permanent , it would mea n tha t German y 
would acquir e territor y containin g 2806638 Germans , bu t also 719127 Czechs , while in th e 
Czec h territor y left to th e Republi c ther e would remai n 6 476 987 Czechs , and 250 291 Germans . 
Thi s is exclusive of the 147000 German s of Slovakia. 
No t th e least flagrant featur e of th e new frontie r settlemen t is its dislocatin g effect upo n th e 
whole railway systém of th e Republic . Th e main railway lineš connectin g Pragu e with the Mora -
vian capita l Brn o (Brunn ) and bot h cities with th e big industria l area roun d Moravsk á Ostrava 
and with Slovakia as a whole , are no w intersecte d by a whole series of Germa n zone s of oceupa -
tion , which exercise an absolut e stranglehol d on th e country' s economi c life. Thus : 
(1) Prague-Brno-Bratislav a line (248 miles) 
(a) 3 miles in th e secto r Úst í n/ O and Dlouh á Třebov á 
(b) 19 miles in secto r Semanín-Brezov á 
(c) 2 miles in Vojkovice secto r 
(d) 5 miles in secto r Pouzdrany-Popic e 
(e) 2 miles in secto r Zajecí-Rakvic e 
(f) 4 miles at Břeclav (Lundenburg) . (Břecla v is on e of th e mos t vital railway junction s of th e 
Republic , where th e lineš from Vienna and from Bratislava mee t on th e way to Pragu e 
and to Polan d and Germa n Silesia. Tha t is th e very reason why it has been oceupied . In -
cidentall y th e racia l statistic s show th e town and its thre e adjoinin g commune s contai n 
18120 Czech s and onl y 1808 Germans) . 
(2) Th e Prague-Olomouc-Prerov-Bohumí n (Oderberg) , (230 miles) . 
(a) 3 miles, same as (1-a) . 
(b) 40 miles in secto r Trebovice-Cervenka . 
(c) 23 miles in secto r Belotín-Jistebník . 
If th e provision of articl e (6) of th e Munic h Agreement , authorisin g th e Commissio n "in cer-
tain exceptiona l cases" to recommen d "mino r modificatio n in th e strictl y ethnographica l deter -
minatio n of zone s which are to be transferred" , mean t anythin g at all, it was surely intende d for 
cases such as quote d above, or for such cases as tha t of th e Brn o water supply, which is no w 
unde r Germa n control , th e reservoirs being situate d just beyon d th e ne w frontie r nort h of th e 
town . 
(4) In th e questio n of a plebiscite , which th e Anglo-Frenc h Pian has discarde d in favour of 
"direc t transfer " th e Munic h Agreemen t accept s th e Godesber g Pian , with th e only differenc e 
tha t th e plebiscit e areas are to be defined by th e Berlin Commission . Such improvemen t as 
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Munic h ma y be claime d to have brough t was wiped out , when th e Commissio n subsequentl y ab-
andone d all idea of holdin g any plebiscite . 
(5) Mr . Chamberlai n laid stress on th e improve d condition s of evacuation , in view of th e 
Godesber g prohibitio n upo n th e remova l of "food stuffs, cattl e or raw materiál" , and said tha t 
th e condition s were to be laid down in detai l by th e Berlin Commission . In actua l fact onl y two 
days elapsed between th e announcemen t of th e line of th e Fifth Zon e and its actua l occupatio n 
by Germa n troops : and thu s on th e on e han d th e populatio n was taken entirel y by surprise , and 
on th e othe r no detail s were forthcomin g from th e Commission . 
(6) H e also appeare d to attac h great value to th e articl e providin g for a right of Optio n int o and 
ou t of the transferre d territorie s within 6 month s of th e Agreement . But thos e acquainte d with 
th e method s adopte d by th e Henlei n Fre e Corp s in th e occupie d district s will dismiss thi s as 
almos t worthless . Optio n will no t be easy for th e occupant s of concentratio n camp s or for th e 
man y who are being subjected to th e same treatmen t as th e Jews of Vienna after th e Anschluß. 
Incidentall y no provision has been mad e eithe r unde r th e Munic h Agreemen t or by th e Berlin 
Commissio n to chec k terroris m in th e district s where Optio n coul d be exercised. I t is no t to o 
muc h to say tha t th e Berlin Commissio n was mad e supreme , no t subject to any highe r instance , 
but tha t in practic e it was little bette r tha n a machin e for registerin g Germa n dictation . 
(7) Finall y Mr . Chamberlai n stressed "th e new systém of guarantees" , as likely to give Cze -
choslovaki a "a greate r securit y tha n she has ever enjoyed in th e past". But if we coul d no t help 
Czechoslovaki a when she possessed a splendidl y equippe d and discipline d army , almos t impre -
gnable defence s and firm alliances , it ma y well be asked ho w we can hop e to help her no w tha t 
she is almos t utterl y defenceles s and robbe d of her man y economi c resources . Th e Ministe r for 
Defenc e was right in announcin g tha t th e Governmen t felt "unde r a mora l Obligation to trea t th e 
guarante e as being no w in force", and it is alread y clear tha t British public opinio n is keenly alive 
to th e mora l aspect of th e whole question . But ho w th e Prim e Ministe r hope s to mak e thi s mora l 
guarante e effective in čase of furthe r aggression, is mor e easily asked tha n answered . 
I t will thu s be seen from th e above survey tha t th e muc h vaunte d Munic h Agreement , as inter -
prete d by th e Berlin Commission , hardl y differs in its result s from th e drasti c Godesber g propo -
sals which th e Prim e Ministe r himsel f so indignantl y rejected as "unacceptable " and as "an ulti -
matu m rathe r tha n a Memorandum" . 
R. W. Seton-Watso n 
Note 
In an earlier Memorandu m circulate d on 26th Septembe r I gave a brief summar y of (1) th e An-
glo-Frenc h Not e (thi s was publishe d for th e first tim e next day in extenso in th e British Whit e 
Paper) , (2) th e Czechoslova k Repl y (still unpublished) , (3) th e joined Demarche of th e British 
and Frenc h Ministe r at 2 a.m . on 21st September . Thi s thir d summar y was referred to by Sir 
Samue l Hoare 1 in th e Hous e of common s on 3rd Octobe r as, "substantially , I may say almos t 
totally , inaccurate" : and Mr . R. A. Butler 2, in readin g ou t to th e Hous e th e text of Lor d Hali -
fax's3 instructio n to Mr . Newton 4 (date d 1.20 a.m . on 21st September ) seems to have though t 
that s he was refutin g m y summary . Thi s rests on a misapprehension , for I was summarisin g no t 
th e instruction s to on e Minister , but th e term s in which th e two Minister s actuall y deliveres thei r 
1 Samue l Joh n Hoar e (1880-1959) , from 1910, Conservativ e MP , Hom e Secretar y 
(1937-1939) . 
2 Richar d Austen Butle r (1902-1985) , Parliamentar y Under-Secretar y in th e Foreig n Office. 
3 Vicoun t Halifa x (1881-1959) , Conservativ e M P (1910-1925) , Lor d of th e Privy Seal 
(1935-1938) , Foreig n Secretar y (Marc h 1938-Decembe r 1940). 
4 Basil Cochran e Newto n (1889-1965) , British diplomat : in Berlin (1929-1937) , British Mini -
ster in Pragu e (1937-1939) . 
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Démarche. The public now has the British Instructions, it still has the right to demand (1) the 
parallel French Instructions, (2) the reports of the actual Démarche submitted by both Ministers 
to their Governments, and (3) the report of their demands, as submitted to the Czechoslovak 
Cabinet. It will then be obvious to everyone why General Faucher, the French member of the 
Czechoslovak General Staff, asked to be relieved of his French citizenship. 
Meanwhile I withdraw nothing. 
R.W.S.[eton]-W.[atson] 
